Abstract: "Was taxation so heavy in the Russian transition that firms could not stay afloat?" is the question that this paper aims to answer. It details the fiscal structure and uses data from a number of sources to calculate statutory tax rates faced by businesses in 1995. The results show that statutory rates were manageable in the short run but unsustainable for several sectors in the long run. Important exceptions are the sectors of oil and gas extraction, which were overtaxed by statutory rates. The problem of tax avoidance and arrears is explored by looking on the difference between statutory and effective tax rates and effective and actual tax payments. Regression analysis shows that tax avoidance rises with gross profit suggesting that profitable firms lobby successfully for tax exemptions. However, when the sectors of gas and oil extraction are excluded from the regression, its estimate becomes insignificant. The paper conjectures that the government deliberately imposed unsustainable statutory tax rates since their consequent renegotiation with oil and gas producers was expected. Tax arrears are found to be strongly and positively correlated with the sectoral average employment. Yet, the hypothesis of strategic labor hoarding is rejected on the grounds that large tax debtors are large trade creditors as well. Finally, the paper asks the question of inflationary taxation. We recalculate input costs at their replacement values and find that almost all sectors are better off going out of business. Searching for possible explanations of why they continued to operate, the benefits and costs of receiving and extending trade and tax non-payments are considered. The results show that enterprises used non-payments to compensate incompletely for the costs of inflation. JEL Code: H3, P2
The statement that a government is a stationary (or even roving! See Olson [1993] ) bandit has resonated soundly among scholars who studied taxation in the Russian transition. The fiscal system that evolved in that country has been generally viewed as repressive, inefficient, and corrupt. The absence of political consensus among the branches of government and active participation of the international financial organizations in the decision-making process politicized the area of Russian public finance. There was no lack of advice that sought and found its way in the tax legislation of the time. Unexpected appearance of amendments to tax and budgetary laws, tax exemptions secretly granted to individual companies, and non-transparency of state spending procedures reinforced general impression of a decaying state robbed by powerful interests.
Field studies showing that tax developments could not be explained by the politics of interest groups alone (see, for example, Alfandari and Schaffer [1996] ) were not within the mainstream.
2 Left without empirical verification, policy makers at home and abroad were generally unable to interpret the situation and found guidance in the generalizations of that time such as the "Washington Consensus". 3 This paper aims at extending the debate about tax system in the Russian transition to the field of quantitative estimation. There are two sets of issues that it addresses. First, the paper details the Russian tax system. Generally, a good exposition of the fiscal laws and regulations is hard to find. 4 Without guidance a researcher cannot infer what part of a contradictory statement such as "Russian taxation is a killer but we operate anyway" is correct. Actual numbers are scattered across a number of publications and are often incompatible. Time series are lacking and have to be constructed by a researcher. Thus, the organization of relevant information in a consistent manner is a contribution that can be used in further work.
Second, and more important, the paper uses the developed account of the tax system to explore several issues. One question relates to the statutory burden of taxation. As we have mentioned above there was a widespread belief that tax rates were excessive, possibly above 100 percent. 5 While this statement looks implausible, a researcher cannot reject it a priori. Then, a reader wonders how else taxpayers would get along if they pay more than receive and tends to exculpate tax evasion in Russia. Finding answer to the question of what is the statutory tax burden is the issue that Section 2 addresses. 2 It is a general problem that there are not many empirical works. EconLit cites 14 papers of mostly theoretical character that contain the roots of word "tax" or "fiscal" and "Russia"). The database of working papers IDEAS, that contains links to about 100,000 working papers, list two papers, which are similar to ours by title: Movshovich, Krupenina, and Bogdanova [1998] and Schaffer and Turley [2000] . Both papers do not address questions discussed here. 3 The Washington Consensus presented international creditors' policy advice given to countries in sovereign default in early 1990s. 4 The author used Chernik and Dadashev [1999] and Pavlova [1999] as the initial guides. 5 A casual search in the Internet reveals statements like "In Russia, the voluntary sector is … subject to repressive tax regimes" (Third Sector, 5 th April 2001); "Regulatory intrusion into enterprise activities is manifested in … repressive, unpredictable, and arbitrary taxation" (Department of Economics Ohio State University Working Paper AEDE-WP-0002-00); "Many heads of small-and medium-size enterprises have long complained their tax burdens are excessive" (The Russia Journal, May 24 th 2002) Section 3 deals with the estimation of tax avoidance. In general, researchers evaluate the size of tax avoidance utilizing other methods than what is used here. 6 Yet, the practice of including the estimate of informal sector in national accounts -that the State Committee for Statistics of the Russian Federation (GKS) adheres to -prompts to calculate tax losses resulting from the existence of informal economy. Certainly, the obtained result depends critically on the methodology used by the GKS. 7 Still, it provides a tentative answer to the question of how important was the problem of tax avoidance in Russia. Moreover, combining the estimates of sectoral tax avoidance with data on tax arrears and deferrals, we can check hypotheses on what sectors are likely to pay less than by statutory rates and using what approaches (avoidance or non-payment).
Section 4 presents estimates of real tax burden in inflationary environment. It is wellknown that inflation biases the actual value of tax bases creating what is called "inflationary profit". "Could it be that real tax rates in Russia were unsustainable in inflation? Did the problem of inflationary profit require ad hoc corrections expressed in a variety of forms?" are two questions that we ask.
To answer the question of sustainability we find replacement costs for intermediate inputs and see if real net profit was still in the positive territory. If it was not, we conclude that tax rates were unsustainable because firms are better going out of business.
The problem of trade and tax non-payment looks differently when we ask the question of how enterprises adjust to the costs imposed by inflation. It has been generally considered that lax discipline and weak legal system were responsible for the growth in trade and tax arrears in the Russian transition. The paper offers alternative explanation. Accumulating debts may mitigate the problem of inflationary profit with arrears serving as a profit stabilizer. We calculate and interpret estimates of actual savings resulted from trade and tax non-payments in the end.
General Computational Approach and Data Used
There are a number of assumptions to make before we can proceed with numerical estimation of statutory tax rates (STRs) on enterprises' sales at consumer prices. They can be justified on either methodological grounds or by unavailability of data.
number of tax innovations. However, the scope of administrative and budgetary problems was larger than expected. Literally overnight, some taxes proved to be non-operational and had to be replaced or abandoned. To patch the holes, temporary amendments to fiscal laws were introduced in haste, creating a legal nightmare for a tax practitioner.
Second, after Russia left the USSR, its several provinces experimented with quasiindependence as well. One of the main bones of contention became the ownership of tax revenue. The federal government insisted that federal laws had preeminence over provincial legislation. The provinces disagreed. After lengthy negotiations, the center and provinces came to tax agreements that reflected the political balance of that time. They were by no means symmetrical across territories, which complicated the tax system further.
Finally, there were many individual tax exemptions granted ad hoc. As a result, the modeling of the Russian tax system of 1995 is not a trivial exercise by many counts.
Before we proceed it is important to determine what "tax" means. The paper follows the definition provided in the Russian legislation. 13 It defines a tax as a mandatory payment to state budgets and state-controlled funds that results from market activity (both incorporated and not) or ownership of certain assets. This definition includes contributions that are usually not counted as taxes by economists. Data on several taxes are incomplete, which is not usually a problem: many taxes produced miniscule revenue and can be safely ignored. In what follows, we consider only taxes that generated large revenue or have identical tax bases. We choose 19 taxes for modeling, including almost all taxes that collect more than 2,000 billion of rubles in revenue. 15 The list of taxes chosen is provided in Table 1 .
Legal documents were found in the Internet, with the main source being the legal database supported by the Russian firm IST. 16 This information includes data on tax bases, rates, and exemptions. It has been possible to verify what documents were in force throughout 1995 and to trace legal changes that occurred during the year for most taxes. The references to laws and regulations that we use in this paper are presented in Appendix B. Memo: total business taxes collected 172,095 155,594 108,697 436,386 a This tax has the total revenue as its base. It is reported under the title of "indirect taxes on products" by the GKS and we do the same to avoid confusion.
The Comparison of Effective and Statutory Taxes for Economic Sectors
The input-output table (GKS [2000a] ) presents data on effective tax liabilities. These numbers differ from what is shown in Table 1 . The disparity is explained by the use of different definitions. The input-output table evaluates the amount of taxes to be paid and Table 1 shows data on the amount of taxes paid actually. Thus, both sets of numbers differ by the amount of tax non-payment accumulated during the reported year.
STRs are found using the model of the fiscal system and empirical data on tax bases.
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The general idea is to apply the legal tax rates as they appear in the fiscal legislation to the estimates of tax bases. If tax rates differ for individual products, as in the case of import tariffs, we disaggregate the tax base in the components, apply the rates individually, and sum them up. The totals of tax liabilities are expressed as fractions of sectoral revenue at consumer prices (see Table 2 ). The estimates of the profit are net of taxes and gross of CCA. Note that the profit in Table 2 is gross of depreciation. The situation changes significantly if CCA is included to account for the cost of capital. The profit becomes negative for six sectors (see Table 3 ). If these sectors pay according to the statutory rates, they would stop operating in free market.
Especially large difference between the statutory and effective rates is detected for the sectors of oil and gas extraction. Both are not viable in the long run under STRs. Note that they (plus agriculture) have large capital outlays. It is worth mentioning that two other sectors with large capital expenditure (coal mining and residential housing) do not show negative profit only because they are heavily subsidized. 20 This finding indicates that taxation was capital insensitive in 1995 and, hence, short-sighted.
The profitability of the sectors of textile, other manufacturing, and agriculture is reduced when STRs apply. Yet, we cannot say that taxation is to blame: both statutory and effective tax rates are less than on average for these sectors. Apparently, their main problems lie somewhere else, for example, in depressed markets for their products.
We conclude that statutory tax rates did not represent a problem in the short run. Virtually all sectors, with the notable exception of oil extraction, could continue operations under STRs. However, in the long run, the statutory claim of enlarged government is found to be unsustainable, especially the claim on the revenue received by the sectors of oil and gas extraction.
Taxes Avoided and Unpaid: Any Pattern?
The difference between the effective and statutory tax liabilities, which we have introduced in the previous section, warrants a closer examination of the reasons for its appearance. Two sources contribute to the difference: the existence of the non-taxable informal sector and the loopholes in the fiscal legislation not accounted for in our model.
As we have mentioned above, the input-output table for 1995 does not discriminate between the revenue of formal and informal sectors of the economy. Thus, we have applied STRs to tax bases that are larger than what tax authorities observe.
In addition, our tax model is a simplified account of the actual situation. 21 Many exemptions have not been introduced due to technical or informational problems. For example, tax rates on mining were specified in the individual licenses, which are not known in general, and we have replaced actual with generic rates that applied before licenses were issued. Similarly, internal expenditures of enterprises on activities covered by Social Insurance Fund (such as maternity leave payments) are deductible from the contributions that firms make to the Fund. Identical exemptions apply to prospecting 19 This finding could be interpreted as a transfer pricing from oil extraction to processing. We talk more about the taxation of oil sector later. 20 See Appendix A1, Table A1 for the values of subsidies as they are reported in GKS [2000a] . 21 Formulas for finding individual taxes are presented in Appendix C. expenses of mining companies (deductible from tax to support prospecting) and maintenance of residential housing rented by companies for their workers (deductible from tax to support residential housing). Thus, there might be legitimate reasons for the difference to exist. Yet, we suggest using the difference as a proxy for tax avoidance due to several rationales. The situation with the informal sector (included in tax bases by GKS) is obvious: tax evasion is the prime motive for its existence. Tax exemptions are more ambiguous. Still, in general, they are suspicious for an economist, especially when the reasons for their existence are buried in legal intricacies or hidden from public eyes. The difficulty of finding answers to the questions why exemptions are granted and how they are administered make them look like favors obtained by particular taxpayers. The difference between effective and actually paid tax rates provide another dataset to be analyzed. 22 Technically, tax deferrals, that are legitimately granted grace period, differ from tax arrears, that are illegitimate delays in payment of taxes. However, from the behavioral point of view they are similar. If a taxpayer manages to delay the payment of taxes for whatever reason, he obtains a credit in the sum of the payment. Certainly, the cost of this credit determines the motive for such behavior. Yet, we can exclude the possibility that the cost of tax non-payment exceeded the cost of credit available from alternative sources.
23 Therefore, both arrears and deferrals deliver some benefit to taxpayers and can be considered jointly. Table 4 presents the estimates of actually paid, effective, and statutory tax liabilities as fraction of revenue at consumer prices. The next step is to construct a model that can explain the choice between tax avoidance and non-payment. A variety of reasons come to mind.
Usual proxy that measures the extent of informal economy is the amount of cash in circulation. It is based on the assumption that cash does not leave "paper trail" and, hence, is ideal for tax evasion. The problem is that the use of cash by sectors is unobservable. We consider that the fraction of consumables in total revenue is closely correlated with cash because trade with individuals is usually conducted in cash.
The political economy of "labor hoarding" has been discussed elsewhere. 24 The argument is that firms grow large due to strategic reasons. The government is more likely to support a huge company, whose problems spill over to the rest of economy, than a small firm. Therefore, the average size of enterprises could influence the tolerance of tax arrears and explain tax favors that fiscal authority grants.
A similar argument with regard to the concentration ratio (CR4 if four largest firms are considered) is found in the field of industrial organization. It is argued that the smaller is the number of competing firms the more likely they succeed in maintaining price collusion. If taxes are treated as costs that firms pay for the right to operate, more concentrated sectors would bargain better for tax deals.
Finally, inability to pay could be a factor that accounts for tax exemptions and arrears. Table 5 and we discuss them in turns.
Gross profit is a significant factor explaining the difference between the statutory and effective tax liabilities. However, the sign of its coefficient is opposite to what is expected: sectors that are more able to pay get more exemptions.
It should be noted that the sectors of oil and gas extraction account for the significance of this result. 25 They have the highest gross profit margins and the largest difference between the statutory and effective tax rates (see Figure 1 ). We propose the following explanation. Recall from Section 2 ( Table 3 , data column 4) that the sectors of oil and gas extraction are unprofitable under the statutory tax rates. Apparently, the government raised statutory tax rates to unsustainable levels ex ante expecting renegotiations to happen with both sectors ex post. Table 4 , gross profit is calculated using input-output data on total revenue at consumer prices, intermediate costs, and wages (see Appendix A, Table A1 ) 25 After we drop the sectors of oil and gas extraction from the regression, the estimated coefficient of gross profit becomes 0.098 with t-statistics being 1.398, which is insignificant at 10 % level. The difference between the statutory and effective tax rates (fraction of total revenue) Gross profit (fraction of total revenue)
GAS OIL
The regression, where the amount of tax non-payment is the dependent variable, shows that the coefficient of the average employment has the expected sign and is significant. There are several potential interpretations of this finding.
Karpov [1997] finds that main tax debtors are large enterprises burdened by the stock of unpaid receivables. 26 He believes that this and other developments (such as the use of money surrogates) indicate that firms behave strategically to avoid paying taxes. The theory of "virtual economy" grows naturally out of this proposition. 27 It considers the tax arrears to be a proof of hidden subsidization that the state provides to politically connected firms. However, it is also possible that the size and arrears are not connected directly but through something else. We postpone making the inference to the end of the next section, where we consider the dependency between trade credits received and extended by sectors and their link to the average employment.
The fraction of consumables in total use does not appear to be a factor that drives tax avoidance and non-payment up. Note that it has the unexpected sign of the coefficient. This result indicates that tax authorities were aware of tax evasion by cash using sectors and, apparently, put more effort into their monitoring.
Inflationary Taxes and How to Live with Inflation
The preceding discussion assumes implicitly that "a ruble is a ruble". However, Russia witnessed a high inflation in the transition and the ruble did not have the same purchasing power at the end of 1995 as it had at the beginning. 28 Could it be that enterprises' net real profit was negative due to inflation while their managers assumed mistakenly that heavy taxation was to blame?
The topic of inflationary taxation is not new. It became popular during the time of stagflation of 1970s. 29 Economists paid special attention to the problems of the inflationary "fiscal drag", when taxpayers move to a higher tax bracket without increasing their income in real terms, and the taxation of inflationary capital gains.
The redistributive effects of inflation were the source of another concern. 30 The idea is that if net borrowers/creditors and different asset owners belong to different wealth groups, some of them lose and others gain from inflation, thus changing the structure of wealth ownership.
Another concern was related to price games that sustain inflation. If agents change prices aiming at extracting gains from one another, the growth in prices follows naturally. "Government versus taxpayers" could be viewed as one of these games. When 26 This finding is somewhat predetermined because he focuses on the reasons for low tax collection and restricts attention to the largest 210 debtors. 27 It is epitomized in Gaddy and Ickes [1998] . 28 In 1995, the consumer price index (CPI) rose by 131 percent while its producer counterpart (PPI) grew by 175 percent. Data are from SITE [2000] . 29 See a review of the literature related to this period in Nowotny [1980] . 30 Inflation itself could be a consequence of redistributive games. See Heymann and Leijonhufvud [1995, p. 55] for references. government is unable to raise tax revenue but has the printing press, it is tempted to pay for purchases with freshly minted money. Since money holders lose a part of their real wealth as the result of governmental purchases, it represents a type of taxation on money holdings.
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In this paper we consider two effects that inflation makes on tax bases. First, to determine the base for CIT accounting costs of material inputs should be replaced with actual, or replacement, costs. Second, we account for changes in the real value of debts.
The concept of replacement cost is explained in Boadway and Kitchen [1999, p. 254] . In inflation, FIFO accounting cost of intermediate products used is less than its replacement cost, so the write-off allowed from the revenue is less than the amount required to replenish the stock of inventories. To account for inflationary profit (that appears due to the underestimation of the costs of inputs), Boadway and Kitchen propose to write off the material input at the time of its purchase. Due to a number of reasons, this proposition is impractical but it offers a framework for the recalculation of the CIT base.
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Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz [1982] present a methodology of finding the replacement cost that we adapt for our purposes. Total intermediate cost for sector j C j r is the product of the transposed vector of its nominal costs C j n and the vector of replacement cost index
Data on the nominal costs C j n are available in the input-output table. We construct replacement cost index I j using annual data on the variation in physical output for j during the production cycle T j (determined in years) and in prices of input i (to be spent in the production of j).
Changes in sectoral prices are not reported continuously and should be interpolated from annual indices. Normalize price index for input i at the beginning of the year to unity and denote p i (1) to be the price index at its end. The price index at time
If we assume that input i is used with the same rate in the production of good j q j (or there is no seasonal fluctuations), the variation in its use changes identically with output. Using the same approach as in [3] we get
FIFO accounting method takes the price of the oldest input as the cost of material inputs to be deducted from revenue for tax purposes. Without loss in generality, we assume that one unit of input is spent in the production of one unit of output. Then, the cost per unit of j produced at t at FIFO prices is p i (t-T j ) while the cost at LIFO prices is p i (t). The change in average cost over the year determines replacement cost index I ji for input i used in the production of j
The vector of individual replacement cost indices, found with equation [5] , is applied to equation [2] , which determines the replacement cost of intermediate inputs consumed by sectors. The replacement costs are deducted from the gross corporate income -instead of nominal costs -determining new tax base for CIT and profit net of taxes (see Table 6 ). Accounting for the replacement costs of intermediate consumption changes estimates of net profit dramatically. Recall from our previous discussion that STRs were manageable for the vast majority of sectors in the short run (see Table 2 , last column). If the burden of input inflation is accounted for, almost all sectors would not be viable both in the short and long run. The estimated reduction in CIT liabilities due to the proposed inflationary CIT credit (see Table 6 , numerical column 3) does not solve the problem implying that the argument for activist fiscal policy is weak.
Given our finding, one would wonder why Russian enterprises did not stop operating in numbers. What can explain this fact? Real federal tax arrears
Several venues are open to companies in financial distress. If problems are temporary, creditors might be willing to renegotiate the schedule of debt payment. If problems persist, firms can be pressed to pay by disposing their assets. Finally, if no payment is coming, creditors can request the restructuring of indebted enterprises (bankruptcy). Russian creditors used all three mechanisms. However, the most popular appeared to be renegotiation of debts, often implicit. The tolerance of trade and tax arrears, that grew spectacularly in the real terms (see Figure 3 ), was puzzling to external observers. 33 We 33 Alfandari and Schaffer [1996] claim that the amount of arrears in Russia was comparable with other industrial economies. Other researchers considered the situation to be unusual. See, for example, Karpov believe that since creditors were willing to wait, the choice of arrears as the dominant method of debt management indicates that non-payments were considered to be manageable.
The estimates of real net profit at replacement cost in Table 6 have not accounted for the changes resulting from the use of trade credit. However, the actual input costs that firms incur in inflation are determined both by the time of use and payment.
To see this, note that the replacement cost is the sum of input purchase price and holding profit resulting from the price increase during the production cycle. 34 If producer of output j receives input i at time 0, pays for the delivery at time S j , and produces the output at time T j , he effectively turns the part (S j /T j ) <1 of the holding into actual profit. 35 This part should not be included as inflationary cost credit that the immediate write-off rule grants.
Since the duration of trade credit C j affects the effective price that producer of j pays, the replacement cost index I ji of equation [6] should be adjusted by the factor p i (t)
The difference between the intermediate costs found using replacement cost index without trade credit I ji (equation [5] ) and the index with trade credit I ji TC (equation [6] ) is a subsidy in real terms that producers receive from their suppliers.
A similar argument applies to tax arrears when they do not involve fines for nonpayment. 36 Legally, government has the right to claim the assets of enterprises that have failed to pay taxes. Due to a number of reasons, tax arrears were partly restructured in longer-term liabilities and partly tolerated by the Russian tax authorities. They could be viewed as another line of credit received by firms.
Unlike trade credit received, which is illiquid in general, tax arrears represent a claim on the revenue that firms can spend on anything. 37 The actual cost of nominal tax arrears to sector j is the loss in the sector's consumption. Postponing payment of taxes by A j , the sector gets inputs and consumables (for workers and owners) cheaper by factor p i A [1997] . The difference in perception may be explained by different objectives (comparative analysis vs. finding ways to improve tax collection) that researchers set. 34 Certainly, if the extension of trade credit involves paying an interest on it, there is no holding profit. It was not a usual practice in the Russian transition to charge the interest on trade credit and arrears. 35 Consider an example. If the purchase price is 100 rubles at the beginning of the cycle and 150 at its end and the producer could store the input without incurring costs, he receives 50 rubles of the holding profit if the input is sold in the end. If he manages to get a trade credit, say for half of the production cycle, and price increases steadily over time, about 25 rubles becomes actual profit. 36 Gaddy and Ickes [1998] consider tax arrears to be implicit subsidies. Their argument is based on the assumption that tax arrears were not penalized. In general, they were with fines being added to tax arrears. We assume for our calculations that no tax penalties were levied for the sake of argument. 37 We ignore the issue of non-monetary trade making this argument. Certainly, if revenue is received in the form of illiquid products, it cannot be spent on everything. This point is not essential for our analysis. -324,381 -464,161 450,100 -70,732 343,228 -722,596 Table 7: The changes in the value of intermediate products assessed at its replacement cost, tax liabilities, and revenue given the benefits and losses resulting from receiving and extending trade and tax credits (in fraction of the reported revenue at consumer prices).
Sources: author's calculations. Data columns 1 and 2 are found as the sum of statutory profit reported in Tables 2 (data columns 5 and 10) and the sum of inflationary costs from numerical column 6
An old saying goes that "one man's gain is another man's loss". From the methodological point of view, if we add the benefit of credits received to real net profit, we need to subtract the cost of credit extended to customers. Let the payment for output j delivered at time 0 be postponed by V j days. Then, its value is reduced by the change in the composite consumption price index for the same period. The cost of trade credit R j extended by sector j is
where M j is total revenue at producer prices and p j V is found by [7] when A j is replaced with V j . Table 7 contains the estimates of the value of credits received and extended as fractions of revenue. Comparing its results with the results of Table 6 , we see that some sectors were in a better financial shape after the benefits and costs of credits were accounted for. Yet, only the sectors of coal and transportation move to the positive territory.
It is interesting to note that sectors redistributed value in inflation (see Figure 4) . 38 The main benefactors were sectors considered to be in poor financial shape (science, electricity, coal mining, machine building, textiles, and agriculture).
An apparent explanation is that trade and tax arrears served as a profit stabilizer in inflation. Companies with low profit margin resorted to arrears to stay afloat. Yet, this proposition does not explain why creditors tolerated arrears. Given the assumption of individual rationality, suppliers extend credit if they are somehow compensated. Table 6 , data column 2. The change in net profit is found as the difference between data columns 2 of Table 7 and 6 The compensation can come in a variety of forms. For example, firms could extend credit at prices that already include interest on expected late payments. Or, through repurchase agreements, debtors bind themselves to supply products at discounted prices. Then, 38 OLS regression supports this proposition: the regression of the type Change = α + β NetProfit delivers the estimate of β = -0.219, which is significant at 1% (t-statistics is -5.509). debtors report low profit because their revenue was already discounted and costsinflated.
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Let us now come back to the result reported in Section 3 that the average employment is a factor explaining the size of tax arrears. This result has been considered as supporting the proposition that "labor hoarding" was used strategically to extract benefits from the state and other creditors. However, if it is correct, we should observe that large sectors extend lesser fraction of their revenue in trade credit than on average. This is not what data show (see Figure 5) . Thus, the hypothesis of strategic hoarding, discussed in Section 3, is not confirmed.
Top borrowers and lenders belong to sectors that comprise large enterprises in terms of employment (electricity, gas and oil extraction, coal mining, and railroad transportation) and they are major receivers of trade credit are large creditors as well. This fact indicates that large companies serve as credit intermediaries for enterprises clustered around them. 40 It is likely that facing financial credit rationing producers organized voluntary trade credit unions with tax arrears being the consequence and not the cause of labor hoarding.
Figure 5: Scatter diagram of trade credit received and extended, in fraction of revenue at consumer prices. Sources: GKS [1998d, table 3 .62 for industries, agriculture, construction, and transportation; sample data for other sectors from accounting documents reported as a part of corporate disclosure for 1995, author's sampling and calculations (10-20 companies per sector). 39 Studying the behavior of relative prices in transition may confirm or reject this hypothesis, which lies outside the scope of this paper. 40 This argument has been advanced by several authors who studied the behavior of financial-industrial groups and large companies in transition. See, for example, Humphrey [2000] that proposes the "starshaped" configuration of non-monetary exchanges. She believes that Russian firms went around the problem of credit crunch by clustering around large companies that served as quasi-financial intermediaries. 
Conclusion
The paper has addressed several questions about transitional tax system in Russia. The initial emphasis has been on the numerical estimation of the statutory tax rates for business, which have been often cited as excessive and driving businesses underground.
The results, reported in Tables 2 and 3 , are ambivalent regarding the importance of statutory tax rates in determining profit net of taxes. On one hand, there are sectors of oil and gas extraction and other activities, which had STRs significantly higher than effective rates. These sectors could not operate with given STRs in the long run.
On the other hand, STRs were not significantly higher than effective rates for the sectors of textile, other manufacturing, and agriculture, which have been found to be unprofitable as well. It is likely that generally low profitability was a factor driving them into red.
The estimates of STRs have been calculated for tax bases that included informal sector and ignored individual tax exemptions. This methodological feature has provided an opportunity to evaluate the importance of informal sector and loopholes for tax collection (see Table 4 ). Along with the estimates of tax deferrals and arrears (defined as the difference between effective and actually paid tax rates), data on tax avoidance have allowed testing several hypotheses on the causes for tax avoidance and non-payment.
The results of OLS regressions have shown that the average employment and gross profit matter (see Table 5 ). More profitable sectors are more likely to avoid taxes. This finding could be interpreted as the evidence of successful lobbying. However, the finding that the sectors of oil and gas extraction are both the most profitable and overtaxed (see the point above) implies that unreasonable tax claims and lobbying for tax exemptions go hand in hand. We have suggested that the government foresaw a bargaining game with oil and gas producers and raised STRs to unsustainable levels expecting renegotiations to happen afterwards.
Finally, we have broadened the question of tax burden and looked on the implications that inflation makes on net profit in real terms. Several issues have been considered. First, we have re-evaluated the value of intermediate inputs spent in production at their replacement costs and found the amount of holding profit. When the holding component has been deducted from net profit, it has turned negative for almost all sectors. Thus, inflation represented a serious problem by biasing the real value of net profit. Yet, introducing the inflationary cost tax credit has been found to be an insufficient incentive for the sectors to continue operating. The estimate of tax credit has been small compared with the costs of inflation (see Table 6 ).
We have considered other options that firms employ to stay afloat in inflationary environment. If debts are not completely indexed, enterprises effectively reduce the costs of operation if they accumulate trade and tax liabilities. We have estimated the benefits and costs of accumulated debts and extending credits under the assumption of no penalty for the late payment. The financial situation has improved somewhat (see Table 7 ). Yet, many sectors have been found still non-viable both in the short and long run.
The comparison of real profit with and without the benefits and costs of trade and tax credits reveals an apparent redistribution of value. Relatively "poorer" sectors of science, electricity, coal mining, machine building, agriculture, and textiles get effective subsidies from other sectors (see Figure 4) . The question of why "richer" sectors lend support is natural to ask next.
We have found that the sectors of electricity, oil and gas extraction, coal mining, and transportation tend to accumulate and extend relatively large trade debts and credit at the same time (see Figure 5 ). These sectors are the largest in the terms of average employment as well. This fact has provided an explanation to our finding that larger firms tend to accumulate larger tax liabilities (see Table 5 ). We have conjectured that firms organized trade credit unions around large companies, which served as credit intermediators, to cope with the problem of restricted access to financial credit. Under such interpretation tax liabilities become a subsequence and not the prime reason for companies to keep large labor force. System [1993] ).
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Since we adjust the table to include features that are important for our analysis, it would be helpful to consider in short how it is organized. 41 An enterprise serves as the primary unit that provides a number of statistical forms upon which the table is constructed. Raw data are aggregated as follows. First, firm's "main output", by which the enterprise's professional affiliation is determined, is separated from its "subsidiary outputs" that are added to appropriate bundles of goods and services. The results are provided in the matrix of supply. It contains columns showing professional affiliation and rows presenting values of specific output. Some sectors are well diversified with less than 70 percent of total output belonging to the main activity, even at the level of aggregation that is reported in the table. Second, cost structure is determined for outputs at purchase prices. The structure is reported in the matrix of use at consumer prices. Finally, transport and trade margins and net taxes on products are deducted from costs, generating the matrix of use at producer prices.
The table as it appeared in print comprises 22 sectors. 42 The sectors are organized according to the Soviet industrial classification OKONKh (see GKS [1976] ), which differs from both ISIC and NAICS 43 classifications.
OKONKh divides economic activities into "material production" 44 and "unproductive sectors". The most peculiar feature for a Western practitioner is blending of mining activities with manufacturing. Mining of oil, natural gas, and coal is reported sometimes separately but, in general, they are aggregated with refineries. Mining of ores is reported together with steel mills and other metal smelters. Mining of raw materials for fertilizers and chemicals goes under the title of chemical and petrochemical industry. Mining of sand and gravel is included in the construction material industry. It makes sense for vertically integrated companies to aggregate mining and their processing but, for tax purposes, it is better to treat them separately.
In this paper, we disaggregate three sectors into seven and two are merged. The main adjustment regards sector of "Oil and gas production". It is divided into the sectors of oil extraction, gas extraction, and oil processing. These three groups are important sources of fiscal revenue and some taxes are specific to them. We use a variety of data sources. Data 41 The general methodology of constructing an input-output table is described in UN [1999] . 42 It is an aggregated version of the original table that contains 223 sectors. The latter is not publicly available. 43 The International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) that is accepted as the benchmark by the UN and Eurostat and the North American Industrial Classification Standards (NAICS), which the US Bureau of Census has switched recently to. 44 That includes any activity generating tangible products, energy, and services that are necessary for both production and distribution of products and energy. on resources and use of oil and gas are taken from the balance of fuel resources (GKS [1997a, table 10 .32]. Natural gas monopoly Gazprom [1998] reports numbers on the consumption of gas by main sectors providing additional information. The domestic producer prices and average export and import prices for oil, gas, petrol, diesel fuel, and heating oil are from GKS [1996c, table 389-90, 396-7] . Consumer prices for the same products are from RET . GKS [1997b, table 6 .4] has data on household expenditure on natural gas, prices of which are regulated. The consumption of fuels by transport is from GKS [1996a, p.208] and by agriculture from GKS [1997a, table 11.14]. Price of fuels for agriculture is from GKS [1998a, table 6.9]. After matrix of use is set determining sectoral output at consumer prices, the output is converted into producer prices by applying transport and trade margins and taxes on products. Data on margins are taken from GKS [2000a] with several sectors that use only oil or gas serving as the benchmark.
On the cost side, imputed output at producer prices is divided into cost components. GKS [1998c, table 4 .4] provides information on consumption of electricity per unit of output for the sectors of oil extraction and processing. GKS [1999a, tables 2.6, 2.9, 10.17, 10.22] gives the number of employees and their average wage rates for 1995. Unfortunately, cost structure from GKS [1998d, table 3.11] provides highly aggregated components of costs and distinguishes only between "the cost of material inputs", "other expenses on production", and "social contributions". Thus, in general the cost of a particular input is found as the product of the input cost reported in input-output table times its sectoral weight in production.
The sectors "Transport and communications" and "Banking, credit, pension funds, government, business management, and NGO" are split in two. We justify the disaggregation on the ground that the input-output matrix is not square. It includes transportation and banking margins (the transportation markup over producer price and the cost of external finance) as separate entries. These margins should be added to costs of transport and banking services. GKS [2000b, tables 2.11 and 2.25] contains information on output, total intermediate cost, labor expenses, and net direct taxes for sectors "Transport", "Communications", "Banking, credit, and pension funds", and "General government, management organizations, and NGO". This information suffices to set border values on revenue structure. However, the itemization of costs that the split sectors incur is problematic. On the use side, GKS [1996a, p. 189] has a table of expenditures on communication services by main economic sectors. The itemization of electricity and fuel costs for the sector of transportation is from GKS [1996a, p. 208] . The rest of cost parameters are found by splitting costs for larger sectors as reported in the input-output table according to their weights. The latter are the sectoral fractions in the total costs on the cost side and the fractions in the output on the use side.
The table does not account for the use of financial intermediation 45 because the structure of borrowers is statistically unobservable. To get around this situation, the table introduces a fictitious sector that consumes the services of financial intermediation but produces nothing. Since this entry does not appear in our final analysis, we have to add 45 That is determined as the difference between the interest earned on financial credit and the interest paid to depositors. its cost to other sectors. GKS [2000b] proposes to add the cost to the sector of "Banking, credit, and pension funds". However, this suggestion amounts to the assumption that banking sector is the ultimate consumer of its own services, which is not obvious. We distribute the value of banking margin among all sectors taking their shares in total banking credit as a proxy for the use of financial intermediation. GKS [1998d, tables 3.23 and 3.27] presents numbers on banking credit for 1996.
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Trade margin is added directly to the sector of "Trade, commercial intermediation, and general market activity", which completes the conversion of the table into a square matrix of costs.
Finally, the sectors of "Coal mining" and "Peat and bituminous shale mining" are merged. The reason is that this sector is unimportant for the economy as the whole and its appearance in the publication is somewhat odd.
We make a number of other adjustments in the table that are justified by the issues that we explore. One regards the itemization of the wage bill that is reported in the inputoutput table jointly with the social contributions. Since we treat the contributions as taxes, they should be separated from wages. The wages paid to employees are found by the multiplication of the total wage expenses reported in the table by the ratio of the wage net of the contributions to the wage gross of them. The latter two numbers are reported in GKS [1998d, tables 3.14 and 16] as components in the cost structure. Missing ratios are taken from GKS [1999a, table 10.2]. To account for possible methodological differences between the input-output table and the cost structure provided in other publications, we adjust the ratios by constructing a coefficient. We take the data on labor expenses for 1992 from the input-output 
where subscripts stand for the source of data and the year of observation. The residual between total labor expenses and wages determines social fees.
The sums of intermediate costs exclude the intermediate expenses on household production. Household production is generally intended to be consumed within households and it is not taxable. Therefore, we need to distinguish between business and household activities in our calculations. The total intermediate expenses on the household production are found as the difference between the total output and the "mixed profit" (from GKS 2000a, Tables "Resources" and "Basic"]. As it is explained in GKS [1998e, Part 5], the line "mixed profits" combines household's equivalent of profit and wages of household producers. Since no data on the technological structure of intermediate consumption for households are available, we assume that they use the same structure (technology) as businesses. Thus, the itemization of the cost structure for the latter stays the same.
The input-output table presents numbers on several taxes. We should note that they stand for assessed taxes and not actual payments, which are smaller by the amount of deferred and late payments. The estimates of taxes on production and corporate income tax (CIT) are unavailable in the input-output table. We approximate their values using our calculations of statutory rates adjusted to meet the sum of the collected taxes (see Table  A2 ) and the annual change in tax arrears (reported in GKS [1996d, table 22] ). The profit net of CIT and gross of subsidies is the residual that brings the total sum of the rows to unity. Table A1 contains columns of cost items, subsidies, and the net profit that are expressed as a fraction of the total revenue at consumer prices. 
Tax on automobile road users
This extra-budgetary tax is stipulated by the Federal Law N 1759-1 dated October 18, 1991 "On the Road Funds in Russian Federation" with tax revenue going to the Territorial Road Funds. 49 The rate for 1995 is determined by the Instruction of the State Tax Services N 30 dated May 15, 1995. It differs for producers and traders. The former pays at the rate of 0.4 percent of total revenue net of VAT, special and excise taxes, and tax on the sales of fuels and lubricants. Traders pay at the rate of 0.03 percent of trade turnover (revenue) minus the same taxes. 50 The instruction explains that budgetary and not-for-profit organizations pay on the value of total revenue from commercial re-sales only. Since commercial re-sales are not the main activity for non-commercial sectors (and data on which are not provided), we consider that they are exempt in our estimation. The share of budgetary organizations is found from GKS [2000b, table 2.11] as the ratio of the total output generated by noncommercial service providers to all operators included in the sector. Agriculture and highway maintenance organizations are exempt as well.
Taxes on Assets

Corporate property tax
This provincial tax is introduced by the Federal Law N 2030-1 dated December 13, 1991 "On Taxation of Corporate Property". The law sets the rate of not more than 1 percent of the value of corporate assets. The specific rate is set by regional authorities. Corporate assets comprise tangible and intangible capital, inventories, and work-in-progress, which belong to the enterprise, at their residual value. 51 Budgetary organizations and NGO, agriculture, education and culture, science, residential and communal services are exempt. Food processing facilities and equipment, highways and railroads, pipelines, electric and communication lines or satellites are exempt from taxation.
The maximum rate is raised to 2 percent by the Federal Law N 62-FZ dated April 25, 1995 "On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements in the Law on Taxation of Corporate Property". The law specifies that it applies to legal obligations that originate from January 1, 1995 and, hence, the rate of 2 percent holds for the whole year. 50 Gross revenue and trade turnover differs in assessment of costs. Gross revenue for traders does not include the cost of goods intended for re-sale only, while trade turnover includes the value of all items sold. 51 Residual value for capital assets is determined as its purchase price plus the cost of its upgrading minus CCA that are granted because of this asset. The value of inventories and work-in-progress is found as its cost.
Pension Funds
The 
Social Insurance Fund
The Presidential Decree N 822 dated August 7, 1992 "On the Fund of Social Security of the Russian Federation" establishes the aforementioned fund and specifies that it accumulates employers' contributions. Tax base and rates are set by the same laws as above.
Tax rate for 1995 is 5.4 percent of the wage bill. The Federal Law N 9-FZ dated July 1, 1994 "On the Federal Budget for 1994" stipulates that the wages of servicemen are not subject to mandatory contributions to the Social and Medical Insurance, and Employment Fund for that year. This paragraph is preserved by the Federal Law N 39-FZ dated March 31, 1995 "On the Federal Budget for 1995".
Mandatory Medical Insurance Funds
This extra-budgetary tax is introduced by the Decree of the Supreme Soviet N 4543-1 dated February 24, 1993 "On the Rules of Payment of Insurance Contributions to the Federal and Territorial Mandatory Medical Insurance Funds". According to the decree employers contribute 3.6 percent of wage bill to these extra-budgetary funds. The Federal Fund gets 0.2 percent while the Territorial Funds receive 3.4 percent. This rate is updated by the same regulations as above. The same exemption as above applies.
Employment Fund
This extra-budgetary tax is established by the Federal Law N 3307-1 dated July 15, 1992 "On Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to the Federal Law On Employment in RSFSR". The law stipulates that employers pay mandatory employment insurance. The rate is set every year by the same law that applies to the funds above. The rate of 2 percent is preserved for 1995. The same exemption as above applies. 
Other payroll taxes
Taxes on Use of Mineral Resources
Tax on mining
This tax is established by the Federal Law N 2395-1 dated February 21, 1992 "On Mineral Resources" with a complex structure of distribution of payments among federal, provincial, and municipal budgets. 53 The structure and tax base is amended by the Federal Law N 27-FZ dated March 3, 1995 "On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Mineral Resources". The latter law replaced the former from March 15, 1995
The Letter of the State Tax Services N NP-6-02/591 dated November 13, 1995 explains that the tax base is the value of extracted minerals at producer prices excluding VAT, excise, and special tax. Natural gas is evaluated at the wholesale price including excise tax. The value of allowed mineral losses is excluded from the base after March 15, 1995 but is included before that date. We ignore this fact as insignificant.
The tax rate is specified in individual licenses granted to mining establishments. The Governmental Edict N 828 dated October 28, 1992 "On Approval of the Statute of the Rules and Conditions of Payment for the Right to Mine, to Use Shelf and Seabed" sets mandatory rate ranges for licenses. Until the license is issued, minimal rates are determined by the Governmental Edict N 478 dated July 9, 1992 "On Temporary Minimal Rates of Payment for the Right to Mine". Since individual licenses are not available, we use the minimal rates that are Oil, natural gas, and coal -8 percent Nickel -4 percent Peat and bituminous shale, iron ore, copper, bauxite, glass raw material, sand, gravel, and clay -3 percent Lead, zinc, tin, molybdenum -2.5 percent Apatite and potassium salts -1 percent
Tax to support prospecting
This tax is introduced by the same law as above. It applies to those companies that mine deposits discovered by state prospectors at state-owned lands.
The Letter of the State Tax Services N NP-6-02/591 dated November 13, 1995 explains that tax base is the value of sold minerals before March 15, 1995 and the value of extracted minerals since then. We ignore this fact as insignificant. The tax base for oil extraction excludes VAT, special and excise taxes, and export tariff and transportation expenses for exported products. The tax base for natural gas extraction is the wholesaleregulated price (that includes excise tax). For the rest of minerals, the tax base is the value of minerals at producer prices. Oil and natural gas -10 percent Hard fuels -5 percent Iron and chrome ores -3.7 percent Non-ferrous and rare earth metals -8.2 percent Apatite and phosphates -3.1 percent Potassium salts -1.7 percent Other extracted materials (apart from underground water) -5 percent Taxes on foreign trade
Import duties
This federal tax is established by the Federal Law N 5003-1 dated May 21, 1993 "On Custom Tariff". The law introduces import and export tariffs at rates that are approved by the Government of the Russian Federation. The specified import rates apply to the goods that originate in the countries with which Russia maintains the most favored nation regime. 54 The rates are set either in monetary units per item or ad valorem.
The rates were amended relatively often and it is hard to trace individual changes. This paper takes the rates determined by the Governmental Edict N 454 dated May 6, 1995 "On Approval of Rates for Import Tariffs". The edict refers to the edict N 169 dated March 10, 1994 with the same name but the latter is not available. Thus, rates set on May 6, 1995 are used for the whole year. Several individual amendments that were introduced in between are considered in the paper. 
Taxes on Specific Goods
Excise Tax
This tax is introduced by the Federal Law N 1993-1 dated December 6, 1991 "On Excise Tax". The law determines the list of goods that are subject to the tax. Tax revenue collected on some goods goes towards federal budget that from other goods contributes to provincial budgets and the rest of revenue is divided between them. The law explains that, in general, the tax base is the value of goods at producer prices including excise.
The Instruction of the State Tax Services N 36 dated July 17, 1995 "On the Rules of Calculation and Payment of Excise Tax" explains that excise is collected ad valorem from consumer price. For example, if strong liquors are taxed at the rate of 85 percent and are sold at 10,000 rubles, the tax due is 8,500.
However, the excise tax on oil is a unit tax. The Instruction of the State Tax Services N 40 dated November 1, 1995 "On the Rules of Payment of Excise Tax on Oil including Gas Condensate and Natural Gas" specifies that the amount of excise tax is per ton of product.
The list of the goods that are subject to excise tax was changed several times. We do not attempt to introduce the whole range of excisable products. The rates on goods included in our calculations are (from the Instruction N 36) The rates on oil and natural gas were changed often in 1995. The Governmental Edict N 678 dated July 13, 1993 "On the Rate of Excise Tax on Natural Gas" sets the rate of excise tax at natural gas at 15 percent of the value at producer prices. The Edict N 208 dated February 28, 1995 changes the rate to 25 percent starting from March 27, 1995. Finally, the Edict N 859 dated September 1, 1995 raises the rate to 30 percent starting from September 1, 1995. We use a weighed average rate in our calculations.
The same story applies to raw oil. The Governmental Edict N 320 dated April 14, 1994 sets the rate of the excise tax on oil at 14,750 rubles per ton starting from May 1, 1994. At the beginning of each month, the rate is indexed by the coefficient of US dollar exchange rate as set by the Central Bank of Russia. The Edict N 304 dated March 29, 1995 "On Export Tariff and Excise Tax on Raw Oil Extracted on the Territory of the Russian Federation" updates the rate to 39,200 rubles per ton with further indexing starting April 1, 1995. Finally, the Edict N 590 dated June 26, 1995 raises the rate to 50,000 rubles for most producers starting from July 1, 1995 (listing several firms that are subject to lower rates).
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The Order of the State Customs Committee N 49 dated January 30, 1993 "On the Collection of Value-Added and Excise Taxes on Goods Exported to and Imported from the Russian Federation" explains that excise tax rates on foreign trade are the same as on domestic products. They apply to the custom value of goods excluding tariff. The Federal Law N 5604-1 dated August 6, 1993 "On the Introduction of Amendments in the Law on Excise Taxes" stipulates that excisable goods that are exported to non-CIS countries are exempt.
from the total value at producer prices including excise tax. Tax proceeds go towards the Federal Road Fund. No exemption is mentioned.
The tax rate for road vehicles (cars, trucks, and buses) is 20 percent of the value of a vehicle at producer prices excluding excise. 57 The Territorial Road Funds are recipients of tax revenue apart from the revenue collected in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which the Federal Road Fund collects. Agriculture and passenger road transportation are exempt.
Taxes on Corporate Profit
Corporate income tax
This tax is introduced by the Federal Law N 2116-1 dated December 27, 1991 "On Tax on Profit of Enterprises and Organizations". The tax revenue is divided between the federal and provincial budgets in the proportion that is set annually by the law "On the Federal Budget".
The tax base is the difference between corporate revenue excluding taxes on products and qualified costs of production. The latter encompasses the cost of intermediate products (including excise tax and the difference in VAT paid and received), capital cost allowances, labor expenses including mandatory contributions to social funds, and other expenses. The list of qualified costs is reported by the Governmental Edict N 552 dated August 5, 1992 "Regulations on the Structure of Expenses that are Included in the Cost of Production and Sale of Goods".
The Federal Law N 64 dated April 25, 1995 "On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements in the Law on Corporate Profit" clarifies ambiguous tax rates that were introduced by the Presidential Edict N 2270 dated December 22, 1993. It stipulates that enterprises pay at the rate of 13 percent to the federal budget and sets the maximum rate of 22 percent for the provincial budgets. The rates apply to all sectors apart from banks, insurance companies, intermediaries, and exchanges that are taxed at 30 percent. The rates apply since January 1, 1995. We assume that the provinces use maximum rates.
The Instruction of the State Tax Services N 37 dated August 10, 1995 "On the Rules of Calculation and Payment of the Tax on Corporate Profit" provides a list of exemptions. Agriculture, budgetary and not-for-profit organizations do not pay the tax. Some expenses made out of profit and activities are untaxed as well. They are:
-investments by industrial companies as they are listed in the General Classification (see GKS [1976] ) provided that capital cost allowances are fully used and gross taxable profit is not reduced by more than half; -expenses on science (R&D) subject to the same constraint inclusive of new investment credit; -education related revenue of education establishments including labor costs; -profit obtained from production of children food; -cultural activities including cinema. This paper considers that education and culture are effectively exempt. We ignore the exemption of children food as a minor point.
Value-Added Taxes
Value-added tax (VAT)
The value-added tax is introduced by the Federal Law N 1992-1 dated December 6, 1991 "On the Value-Added Tax". Its revenue is divided between the federal and provincial budgets in the proportion that is set by the law on the federal budget of a particular year.
The tax is found as the difference between the tax assessed on the total revenue of delivered products and the tax paid on intermediate goods and services written off in their production. All taxes are included in the tax base apart from VAT and the special tax paid on intermediate products 58 . A credit on the VAT paid on capital inputs can be deducted in equal installments within six months.
The rates for 1995 are 10 percent for a number of food staples and children apparel and footwear goods and 20 percent for the rest. The lists of goods taxed at 10 percent are listed in the Government Edicts N 888 dated November 20, 1992 "The List of Goods for Children That Are Taxed at the Rate of 10 Percent Starting in January 1, 1993" and N 659 dated July 1, 1995 "The List of Food Products That Are Taxed at the Rate of 10 Percent". We detail the following items taxed at 10 percent in our calculations -Coats, overalls, jackets, suits, dresses, skirts, shirts, hoses and socks, sweaters, and footwear; -Meat and fish products, butter, whole milk products, vegetable oil, sugar, bread, flour and groats, spaghetti, salt; -Potato, vegetables, and eggs.
The Instruction of the State Tax Service N 39 dated October 11, 1995 "On the Rules of Calculation and Payment of the Value-Added Tax" lists other goods and services that are exempt from taxation. We consider the following exemptions -goods and services exported to non-CIS countries; -coal for household consumption; -inner-city and suburban passenger transportation; -rental payments; -educational services including school and college eateries; -scientific research including industrial design; -cultural services including cinema; -pharmaceuticals and medical services (excluding veterinary).
The Order of the State Customs Committee N 49 dated January 30, 1993 "On the Collection of the Value-Added and Excise Taxes on the Goods Exported to and Imported from the Russian Federation" explains that the VAT on imported goods applies at the same rates as those that apply to domestic producers. Tax base is the custom value of goods including excise tax and tariffs where applicable. For example, if the custom value is 1,000 rubles and tariff and excise rates are 30 percent, VAT at 20 percent rate is 260 rubles. The order explains that the VAT on the goods and services imported from the CIS is not collected on the border. This means that the cost of intermediate goods imported from those countries do not count towards tax credit.
Special tax to support the most important economic sectors
This federal tax is introduced by the Presidential Decree N 2270 dated December 22, 1993 "On Changes in Taxation and Distribution of the Fiscal Authority among the Budgets". Its revenue is divided between the federal and provincial funds that support industries deemed to be important. The decree specifies that the tax base is the same of that of the VAT and sets the rate at 3 percent.
The Federal Law N 25-FZ dated February 23, 1995 "On the Special Tax to Support the Most Important Economic Sectors of the Russian Federation" lowers the tax rate to 1.5 percent and annuls the tax starting January 1, 1996.
The Instruction of the State Tax Service N 39 dated October 11, 1995 "On the Rules of Calculation and Payment of Value-Added Tax" explains that the new rate applies to tax obligations that have resulted after April 1, 1995. Before that date, the rate of 3 percent applies. The list of exemptions is identical to that of the VAT. We use weighted rate of 1.875 percent for the tax and combine it with the VAT in our calculations.
Appendix C: The Methodology of Calculating Individual Statutory Tax Rates.
Appendix B identified general tax parameters such as rates, bases, and main exemptions. Now we turn to constructing equations for individual statutory tax rates. We have to determine how to organize the available data. Since our main interest lies with the taxation of economic sectors, we normalize different tax rates to the sectoral revenue at consumer prices.
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The normalization is done in two steps. At first, we define tax bases and apply relevant legal rates (as they appear in the fiscal legislation) arriving at statutory tax liabilities in absolute values. Then, the liabilities are divided by the sectoral revenue. The ratio is the individual statutory tax rate. The rates are presented in Table C2 .
In what follows, we explain data used and provide formulas for finding rates. The definition of parameters that we use below is provided in Table C1 . The formulas to calculate individual statutory tax rates are as follows: 1) Tax to support residential housing applies to revenue at consumer prices minus VAT and export tariffs with no exemptions
2) Tax on automobile road users applies to revenue at consumer prices minus direct taxes (VAT, taxes on the sales of fuels, lubricating oils, and road vehicles, excise tax, and export tariffs). Agriculture, highway maintenance, and budgetary organizations are 59 The value of a product at consumer prices is the sum of its value at producer prices and the direct taxes paid on the sale net of taxes paid on intermediate products. In the input-output framework, the value of the product at producer prices includes the following components: the cost of intermediate products (including the direct taxes net of subsidies on products and trade and transport margins), labor expenses gross of social contributions, gross profit, and the indirect taxes net of subsidies on production. Since our emphasis is on taxation, we subtract household production from the sectoral revenue as irrelevant to our research and add the net direct taxes paid by final consumers.
exempt. Sector of trade pays on trade turnover. Turnover for retail and wholesale trade comes from GKS [1997a, tables 15.1 and 25] ( ) The value of excise taxes paid by a sector 8 
ExciseRev
The value of products at producer prices subject to the excise tax and the tax on the sale of road vehicles or the value of products at producer prices plus the excise tax subject to the tax on the sales of fuels 9 Fuels
The value of taxes on the sales of fuels, lubricating oils, and road vehicles paid by a sector 10 M T The transposed matrix of imported intermediate products from the input-output The generic name for a statutory tax rate of the tax considered within the paragraph 19 
XnonCIS
The value of sectoral export to non-CIS countries 20 Xtar
The export tariffs paid by a sector 21 
VAT
The VAT paid by a sector 22 
VATnonCIS
The VAT legal rates on products imported from non-CIS countries 23 Wage
The wage bill found according to the procedure explained in Appendix A1 where j stands for a mineral belonging to sector J. 7) Export and import tariffs are levied on the total volume of trade given in the inputoutput table. For the purpose of taxation, we need to itemize data for particular product groups. GKS [1996c, table 357] contains numbers for the custom values in US dollars of 130 items that cover around 80 percent of total exports and 60 percent of imports for 1995. It distinguishes between the trade with CIS and non-CIS countries, which is used in the calculation of the excise tax rate. We convert the values from dollars into rubles using the annual average rate for 1995 as set by the Central Bank of Russia (data on exchange rate changes are from the legal database supported by IST). Several sectors are not represented in the data. Pharmaceuticals stand as the only item in sector "Other manufacturing" and its rate applies to the whole sector. The only service sector that is taxed is the sector "Other activities related to production and services" since it is treated in the input-output table in this way. 60 Its taxable items are not on the list of traded products and its rate is found as the ratio of export tariff to the value of export reported in the input-output table. For both import and export tariffs, we calculate the weighed average rate based on items reported. The tax bases are constructed differently for import and export. For import tariffs we take the sectoral value of import as reported in the table as the base. Export tariffs apply to the items reported in GKS [1996c, table 357 ] only. The rationale for different treatment lies in the assumption that export tariffs apply to a limited list of specific items and not to unmentioned products. On the contrary, import tariffs cover the whole range of unmentioned products. This assumption is justified by a more inclusive structure of import rates (that cover two-digit specifications of goods as mentioned in the Russian trade classification VED) whereas export rates apply to 4-or even 6-digit specifications.
The rates for excise tax and tax on the sale of fuels and road vehicles on imported items are included in import tariff rates since they are collected at the border. 61 To find the normalized sectoral rates of import tariffs, we multiply the transposed matrix of the intermediately consumed import by the weighed averages of import tariff rates. The rates for export are normalized by the ratio of the value of exported items to that of total output. The formula for finding the statutory export rate is 
8)
Excise tax applies to the products of seven sectors. In addition, two of them pay taxes on the sales of fuels, lubricating oils, and road vehicles. Since the taxes are determined similarly, we consider them jointly. Generally, tax rate applies to the value of excisable products at producer prices. Since we do not have the total value of excisable products sold, we find it as the product of physical output and average producer prices. The data on physical output are from GKS [1997a, 
9)
Corporate income tax has the tax base that is the residual of the total revenue at consumer prices minus qualified expenses. We include the size of losses from GKS [1998d, table 3.7] to account for the non-transferability of losses within sectors. Deductible expenses are the value of intermediate inputs, the wage bill gross of the social contributions, the capital cost allowances (CCA), the indirect taxes, and the allowances on new capital investment and R&D. The first two items are from the input-output table. The value of CCA is given in absolute values in GKS [1999b, tables 3.4 and 4.4] but in a highly aggregated form. We use the product of total sectoral revenue at producer prices and the CCA weights in the sectoral revenue structure as a proxy for granted CCA. The weights are found as the shares of CCA in the cost structure reported in GKS [1998d, table 3.14 and 3.16; 1996a, p. 213, and 1998b, GKS [1999b, tables 7.5 and 7.6] . Some service sectors are missing and we use data on capital assets that are put into operation as the proxy (see GKS [1999b, table 2.7] . This item is deductible in the amount that exceeds CCA granted in that period if the sum of two last exemptions does not exceed half of gross profit 
10)
Value-added (VAT) and special taxes apply to the output at consumer prices net of 62 The base excise value for gas is from the Letter of State Tax Service N NP-6-02-02/62 dated February 8, 1995 "On indexing of wholesale price of natural gas for industries". It sets the price for February -81,232 Rubles per thousand m 3 . 63 It is unclear whether exported gas is taxed but, judging by indirect evidence, it is not (see Presidential decree N 2213 dated December 26, 1994).
VAT. The calculation of VAT proceeds in two steps. First, the gross tax liabilities are assessed at a given tax base. Second, the tax paid on intermediate products is deducted with the residual representing the net tax liability. Since we use the revenue gross-of-VAT normalizing rates to the same numeraire, we re-arrange terms getting VAT into the denominator. Budgetary organizations, pharmaceuticals, health, education, culture, and science establishments are exempt. The value of pharmaceutical output is from GKS [1997a, table 10 .78].
Several food products are taxed at a lower rate. Their output in physical units is from GKS [1998c, table 11.80; 1997a, table 11.6 and 11.24] and their producer prices are from GKS [1998a, tables 4.1, 4.11] . We take 15 product groups (out of 38 groups for which data are available) for sector "Food processing" and 3 product groups (out of 12 groups) for sector "Agriculture". Adjusting for products taxed at lower rates changes tax credits that other sectors, that use them as intermediate inputs, receive. The rest of products taxed at lower rates do not generate the credit. They are for final consumption only, such as coal for households, children apparel, passenger inner-and by-city transportation, and residential rent. We exclude the value of these products from the VAT base directly. The amount of coal consumed by households in physical units and its producer price are from GKS [1997a, table 10.32 and 1996c, table 389] . The volume of children products in physical units is found on the basis of 10 items the production of which is reported in GKS [1998c, The total actual payment of taxes and fees is not reported for individual sectors. We construct an account of tax paid using information from a number of sources.
The principal source is the input-output table that provides number on the nominal value of assessed taxes. By definition, the sum of tax arrears and deferrals represents the difference between assessed and actually paid taxes. The problem is to determine what they were for the sectors appearing in the input-output table in 1995. GKS [1998d, table 3.58] contains data on the total size of tax (and social fees) arrears at the beginning and the end of the year. They are insufficient for our purposes. Only four main sectors are presented with further disaggregation of the sector of mining and manufacturing into ten industries. Memo: Assessed taxes 20,522 7,032 25,348 95,006 20,596 11,537 6,200 6,775 7,156 
Billions of rubles
Memo: Actual collection 12,285 4,754 15,790 73,709 15,979 8,951 4,810 4,345 6,756 Yet, the estimates found cover only 13 out of 25 sectors. Apparently, GKS did not calculate both total debt and arrears for the rest of sectors prior to 1998. We should find a reasonable proxy for them.
The following approach is used. There is a sample of accounting information for 4,244 companies for 1997. 64 We take the values of the stock of tax and social fees debt on the beginning of 1997 and find the ratio of the debt to total revenue for each missing sector 65 and for the sector of mining and manufacturing, which serves as a benchmark. Then, we approximate the value of tax arrears and deferrals accumulated during 1995 as Apart from finding the change in the stock of tax and fees liabilities, we calculate parameters that are used in testing the hypotheses on tax avoidance and non-payment. There are three parameters of interest: average size of the firms within sectors, concentration ratio, and the fraction of consumables in the total use. The rationale for mentioning these parameters is provided in Section 3.Total number of employed within sectors is presented in the input-output table. We find the number of enterprises in GKS [1997a, table 9.1 and individual tables related to sectors of manufacturing and mining], which is the average for the year.
The concentration ratio for four largest firms (CR4) is from GKS [1997a, table 10.9] for the sectors of manufacturing and mining. Other sectors are found using the sum of the revenue of four largest companies received in 1997 (from the sample of 4,244 companies introduced above) to total revenue reported in that year. 64 It is introduced in Ivanenko [2001, Appendix A] . 65 The sector of residential housing is represented by gas utilities and hotels and the sector of health -by sanatoriums and tourist agencies. The sector of banking is approximated using reports of investment companies. No data is reported on general government that is assumed to be similar to the sector of residential housing. 
